Ancient Christian Witness

Maximus Scott did an awesome post about Predestination over on the Classical Christianity blog:


The link:
http://classicalchristianity.com/2011/02/15/on-predestination/

From pages 207-211

"The opposition of Christ's human will to the divine will was seen to occur for two reasons: one, because of the confusion of person and nature implied in the Augustinian understanding of original guilt; and two, because fallen humanity is the same humanity to be found in Christ, inclusive of its opposing will. Christ's predestination is therefore the same as ours because it is by grace: the divine will overcomes Christ's human will in an irresistible manner, much as the divine will overcomes the human will in the case of those predestined to salvation. But this led the Spanish Adoptionists to assume two sons, one of nature, the other of grace. And this in turn implied that they confused a personal characteristic, that of sonship, with that of nature and have thus come full circle back to the confusion which began the process. It is this whole vast and intricate matrix which related Spanish Adoptionism and its underlying predestinational Christology to the filioquist controversies of the ninth century. This would suggest that the Spanish Adoptionist predestinational Christology and the filioque share a common ancestry. That ancestry is Neoplatonism, and it is this consideration which incites, indeed, compels, comparison between St. Maximus and St. Augustine. The filioque is ultimately derived from the philosophical and neoplatonic definition of simplicity and its accompanying dialectic of oppositions. Each of the problems that attended Neoplatonism - the identity of being and will and its consequences of an eternal generation of the Son indistinguishable and indivisible from an eternal creation, the dialectical opposition of the simplicity and the dialectic in collapsing into an infinite series of beings as in the neoplatonic system of Iamblichus, or in erasing all distinctions between beings as in the Neoplatonic Pantheists, the structural subordination of all pluralities to the One-all these implications are to some extent present in the trinitarian theology of St. Augustine.

St. Augustine assumed that if there could be common ground between theology and philosophy there could be common definitions as well. He found this common definition in the neoplatonic definition of the simplicity of the One. Appropriating this definition as an understanding of the divine essence of the Christian Trinity, as a definition of the unity of the Christian God, he made of it the ultimate basis of his attempted synthesis. Consequently it is at the Augustinian doctrine of God that the point of contact between theology and philosophy occurs, and it is through this doctrine of God that the Augustinian conception of predestination must be approached. A proper understanding of Augustine Triadology will yield a proper understanding of the logic and structure behind its predestinational doctrine.

When he appropriated the definition of simplicity as a definition of the divine essence of the Trinity, he accepted it uncritically, and thus made his "philosophical first principle one with his religious first principle" to such an extent that as the French Roman Catholic Etienne Gilson observed, even his notion of divine being "remained greek," that is, ultimately pagan. Therefore, insofar as his doctrine of predestination is derived from this pagan definition of the divine essence, it is to that extent that it is pagan in its roots. It is at the point of this definition that the divine essence begins to be abstracted from the plurality of attributes and persons as a prolegomenon to theology. In other words, once he had assumed the simplicity as a definition of the divine essence in its full Neoplatonic sense, the essence becomes increasingly singled out ans strictly distinguished from all the divine "pluralities," the attributes and the persons. The dialectic of opposition between the One and the many is already in evidence in this step, and two things occur because of it. First, the unity of God is seen in impersonal and abstract terms. St. Augustine states it this way: "The divinity is the unity of the Trinity." But more important is the fact that, at this stage at least, the persons and the attributes are accorded the same logical status. And thus St. Augustine can say that

He is called in respect to Himself both God, and great, and good, and just, and anything else of the kind; and just as to Him to be is the same as to be God, or as to be great, or as to be good, so it is the same thing to Him to be as to be person.

Underlying these mutual identities is the simplicity, once again functioning as a great metaphysical "equals" (=) sign, and consequently the conclusion that the person are attributes or that the attributes are persons is inescapable.

But when he turns to consider the attributes themselves, they become identical with the divine essence and alternative names for it: "The Godhead," he writes, "is absolutely simple essence, and therefore to be is there the same as to be wise. And this leads to the further implication that since the attributes are identical to the essence, they are identical to each other: "In regards to the essence of truth, to be true is the same as to be and to be is the same as to be great....therefore to be great is the same as to be true." A=B and B=C, ergo A=C. Reason, logic, and simplicity are the very essence of the divine essence. It is this identity of attributes amongst themselves which led to three very different conclusions, conclusions which are nevertheless related, for they depend upon this identification of the attributes amongst themselves.

First, it is this identity of the attributes with themselves and with the divine essence that allowed Thomas Aquinas, who inherited this definitional understanding of the divine simplicity from St. Augustine, to assert the identity of the divine essence with the divine will. The simplicity is absolute; therefore God's will is not other than His essence," a proposition common with Plotinus, and a proposition at the root of the Origenist problematic. Unlike the Athanasian response to this problematic, which depended upon the distinction between essence and attributes being a formal one, this understanding of the simplicity is a definitional one, and it is this which is the ultimate root of the Western difficulties with Palamism: there cannot be ultimate and equal goods which are really distinct from the divine essence as well as being really distinct from each other.

Second, the Augustine doctrine of predestination must, to a great degree, be referred to this identity of attributes amongst themselves, in other words, to this identity of attributes amongst themselves, in other words, to predestinate is the same as to foreknow. If God foreknows the damned and the elect, He also predestines them. The evaluation of Jaroslav Pelikan is therefore not entirely correct. It is in regard to this identification of the attributes of predestination and foreknowledge that he wrote "what was needed to correct and clarify the Augustinian doctrine was a more precise definition of predestination that would distinquish it from grace." But since the deterministic aspects of Augustinism appear to be not so much biblical as neoplatonic and logical, as they are rooted in a particular dialectically-derived definition of the divine essence, it would appear that what is needed is precisely not another definition, but a non-definitional understanding of the divine simplicity, one which would not permit the term to function as an "equals" (=) sign which identifies the pluralities of attributes.

Finally, this identification of the attributes amongst themselves plays an important role in the derivation of the filioque. Because the categories of the persons and attributes, as multiplicites contrasted to the simple essence, all serve as logically interchangeable definitions of the simple divine "something", the question for St. Augustine then became one of securely maintaining the real distinction of persons in the face of a simplicity which had already nullified the real quality and distinctions of the attributes amongst themselves. Here the subordination of the persons and attributes to the essence in the ordo theologiae also provides St. Augustine with the means to attempt to distinction the persons from each other. Having assumed an absolute, definitional simplicity, the person can no longer be absolute hypostases, but are merely relations, since the names Father, Son, and Spirit are terms relative to each other. Here again there is a subtle but nevertheless real play of the dialectic of oppositions. One no longer begins with the three persons (since one has already began theology at the divine essence) and then moves to consider their relations, but begins more with their relative quality, with the relation between the persons, itself. In other words, there is an artificial opposition of any given person to the other two. It is at this point that the flexibility of St. Augustine's neoplatonic basis begins to surface in a more acute form." [1]

[1] pages 207-211 from the book Free Will in St. Maximus the Confessor by Joseph P. Farrell

From the Introduction:

The fact that God desires the salvation of all does not mean that all are saved. God saves only through love and freedom. This point is exactly what theologians under the influence of Augustine have never comprehended. Thinking that the divine essence, energy, and will are identical, they were not in a position to even suspect that free beings outside of God are capable of acting against the divine will. Therefore, it is not at all strange that Western theologians find a kind of crypto-Pelagianism everywhere in the Greek Fathers and attempt to justify themselves by inquiring if there is some unexplained reason why the Eastern Fathers were not interested in the great problems of original sin and divine grace that preoccupied the West. It is very natural for them to think this way since they have erroneous preconceptions about God's relations with the world. As a result, it is impossible for them to seriously accept that death exists in the world as a kind of parasite apart from the will of God, and that the divine will and the salvific divine energy are not one and the same thing. God does not will death. Nevertheless, He does not act to destroy it until He has prepared men to accept life.

In 431, the Holy Fathers of the Third Ecumenical Synod at Ephesus condemned Pelagianism and emphasized that death is unnatural and grace is of absolute necessity for salvation. The president of the Synod and chief polemicist against the heresies was St. Cyril of Alexandria, who wrote the following about the transmittal of the ancestral sin to the descendants of Adam: "But what can one say? Yes, Adam indeed fell and, having ignored the divine commandment, was condemned to corruptibility and death. But how did many become sinners because of him? What are his missteps to us? How could all of us who were not yet born be condemned together with him, even though God said, 'Neither the fathers shall be put to death because of their children nor the children because of their fathers, but the soul which sinneth shall be put to death? Surely, the soul that sins shall die. For we became sinners through Adam's disobedience in such a manner as this. He was created for incorruption and life, and the manner of existence he had in the garden of delight was proper to holiness. His whole mind was continuously seeing God while his body was tranquil and calm, and all base pleasures were still. For there was no tumult of alien disturbances in it. But since he fell under sin and slipped into corruptibility, pleasures and filthiness assaulted the nature of the flesh, and in our members was unveiled a savage law. Our nature thus became diseased by sin through the disobedience of one, that is, of Adam. Thus, all were made sinners, not as co-transgressors with Adam. which they never were, but being of his nature, they fell under the law of sin...In Adam, human nature fell ill and became subject to corruptibility through disobedience, and, therefore, the passions entered in."

The strong juridical character of Latin theology which led the West to the satisfaction theory of Anselm is absent from the Greek patristic tradition. In the East, the fall is understood to be a consequence of man's own withdrawal from divine life and the resulting weakness and disease of human nature. Thus, man himself is seen as the cause through his cooperation with the devil. In the West, all the evils in the world originate in the punitive divine will, and the devil himself is seen simply as God's instrument of punishment. The Greek Fathers look upon salvation from a biblical perspective and see it as redemption from death and corruptibility and as the healing of human nature which was assaulted by Satan. Therefore, they established the following principle as the touchstone of their christological teaching: "That which is not assumed is not healed, but that which is united to God is also saved." It is quite opposite in the West where salvation does not mean, first and foremost, salvation from death and corruptibility but from divine wrath. And the termination of the penalty of death and illnesses simply follows as a result of the satisfaction of divine justice. For the West, this is quite natural since, on the one hand, God is believed to punish all men with death while, on the other hand, it is man who provokes the punishment because he bears inherited guilt. Thus, according to the Western viewpoint, God did not become man in order "to abolish him who has the power of death," since it is God who is death's causative power, but to satisfy Himself to such a degree that He could look upon men with a somewhat more benevolent attitude and, at the Second Coming, lift the old death sentence from them.

The method of dealing with theological problems and their presuppositions is altogether different between the East and the West. The West's deluded cosmological conceptions permit the study of the divine essence by identifying it with the divine energy. Both analogia entis and analogia fidei are methods and presuppositions of the West's theology. All things in the world are simply the images in time of archetypes that exist eternally in the essence of the One. Therefore, in the Western view, the works of Satan that are found in the Holy Scriptures, in a certain sense, belong to God Who punishes man with death, corruptibility, and all of man's sufferings. Nevertheless, it is apparent that, in this manner, divine and satanic energies become dangerously confused. Precisely because the West perceives the world as an image of the divine essence, it is capable not only of distorting the biblical teaching about death and Satan but even of applying the analogia entis and the analogia fidei to the dogma of the Holy Trinity, thus introducing the teaching of the Filioque.

In determining the dogma of the fall, however, it is not simply a matter of searching in the Holy Scripture and in the Fathers for the appropriate passages that prove a preferred theory of the ancestral sin. First, the relations between God and creation must be determined according to the scriptural and patristic testimony. Is the world really an analogous copy of the ideas that exist eternally in the divine essence, as the Neo-platonists believed? In other words, can we accept the theory of Augustine and the Scholastics which says that God is creative, just, and prescient in His essence because He comprises the alleged archetypes of creation and the order among them, which constitute ingenerate, eternal, divine law? Can we accept that the creation ex nihilo, the creation from nothing preexistent, is simply a copy in time of the ingenerate archetype in the divine essence? And that sin and the fall are a temporal violation of the order in the archetypal ideas in the divine essence? Can we accept the acholastic identification of the divine essence with the uncreated divine energy yet reject the apparent pantheism, as the West does? Can we accept the West's sophism that God does not have direct and real relations with the world because this would mean that the divine essence has an essential dependence in relation to the world? And that God, therefore, has only indirect relations with the world because because He loves and knows the in its archetypes? Can we accept the idea that love of God for this world descends as a created thing, in other words, in the form of created grace, because a true divine love for the world would mean that God is dependent upon the world?

If, however, it is both by essence and energy, since these are said to be identical, that God knows the archetypes and truly loves only these directly, how does He have knowledge of evil or, at least, of the need to send His Son into the world for the salvation of fallen mankind? If God's essence, energy, being, will, knowledge, and omnipotence are all identical, what place does the creation ex nihilo have in this scheme? What place has the Holy Trinity? Was it the divine essence that received flesh from the Virgin? If God is truly actus purus yet He is also able to have knowledge of evil or of mankind's need of salvation, then the ideas of evil, need, the fall, and nonbeing must also be among the archetypes in the divine essence. It follows that the idea of evil must be of the same essence as the idea of goodness because, if it is separate or independent of it, the scholastic theory of divine omniscience falls apart--unless we accept that that evil does not exist and that the need for true salvation from evil is nothing more than an empty myth.

The confusing of the divine energy with the divine essence only leads to the introduction of some of predestination into Christian theology. This in fact happened with Augustine with the Anselmian redemptive theory, with Calvinism, and finally with liberal Protestant which generally inclines toward the acceptance of the nonexistence of evil and the final restoration or salvation of all.

A detailed examination of the scholastic and Protestant confusion of essence and energy of God is beyond the bounds of our subject. Nevertheless, we are required to examine certain aspects of it that relate to the problem of the ancestral sin. This will be done in connection with the necessary examination of some of the general characteristics of Greek philosophy that have a direct bearing on our subject and on the period in question. In this way, the overall similarity between the Western view of God's relation with the world and the view of Greek philosophy will become apparent. Likewise, the magnificence of the Greek Fathers will come to light all the more, especially their ability to transfer their forefathers' subtle and analytical thought from paganism to Chhristianity in order to fortify the evangelical faith instead of overtuning it as the West did.
Once we have determined what the relation is between God and the world according to the theologians of the period underexamination and have taken into account certain understandings of the Fathers about God, then we will be in a position to examine objectively the biblical patristic teaching regarding Satan, the destiny of man, justice, and the fall." [1]

[1] pages 33-38 from the book The Ancestral Sin by Fr. John Romanides, translation by George S. Gabriel

As seen from The Preachers Institute.com by David Bradshaw

Quote:
"The change is illustrated by the career of Augustine, who tells us in the Confessions how much he detested Greek as a boy and how glad he was to put it behind him. His entire theological formation seems to have taken place without reference to the enormous body of Greek theological writing which was at that time the main repository of Christian thought. Although this absence no doubt aided the flowering of Augustine’s originality, it meant that the legacy he bestowed on the western church was remarkably disconnected from the earlier tradition.

Meanwhile the Greek tradition continued along its own path, almost wholly oblivious to the enormous importance that Augustine had attained in the West. No works of Augustine were translated into Greek until the thirteenth century, while only a few of the later Greek works—most famously, the Dionysian Corpus and the De Fide Orthodoxa of St. John of Damascus—were translated into Latin. Since these were read outside of their original context, however, they were often misunderstood, particularly at points where they are at odds with Augustine.

Thus the theology which influenced western philosophy was primarily that of Augustine and his Latin successors. One might think that with the recovery of Greek learning in the Renaissance this imbalance would have been corrected. By that time, however, a long succession of councils and popes had made it clear that western Christianity was and must remain fundamentally Augustinian."

To read the rest please visit Preachersinstitute.com

A great article!

Eventhough I don't really like this book because the author was too critical of christianity while somewhat sympathetic with various forms of gnosticism, I did find good nuggets here and there.

Quote:
"St. Augustine(354-430) was, for the time being,
the last in this chain of development. With his Manichean past stretching over
almost ten years, he had acquired personal experience of the gnostic heresy, and
had reflected on its dangers and value*. He appropriated this heritage most
clearly in the impressive historical review of the two "realms" (civitates), the
devil's or that of the wicked (civitas diaboli or impiorum,) and God's (civitas
Dei), and thus shaped the Christian historical metaphysics of the Middle Ages.
Other aspects of his teaching, too, cannot be understood without this heritage
which is linked closely with the related late Platonic, such as the famous faith
in predestination (grace and election), the role of the soul as being in the image of God and thus an immortal element and, above all, the concept of original sin. This latter is the result of man's fall from the divine original state brought about by his own guilt. Its position in Augustine's teaching is an echo of the Manichean idea of the fateful "mixture" of light and darkness, spirit and matter,which necessarily determines human existence. One has attributed to St. Augustine, because of his turning away from Manichean Gnosis and because of his overcoming the problems raised by it, a decisive importance in the final acceptance of the ancient understanding of the cosmos as a good creation of God in opposition to the gnostic hostility to the world. " [1]

This is the second time I noticed someone link Saint Augustine's belief in predestination with neoplatonism. Perry was the first to tell me about Plotinus and Augustine in regards to determinism, as seen here:

Quote:
"On another point, the reasoning trying to show
that moral responsibility and freedom are compatible with determinism in
Augustine mirrors exactly what the Pagan Plotinus in his Enneads wrote nearly
two centuries prior to Augustine. The soul that falls is determined to do so,
but chooses freely to fall nonetheless and is therefore responsible. This is
significant since Augustine's dying words were quotes from Plotinus'
Enneads."

and now Kurt Rudolph seems to be saying something similar, and so, I have to find out what late Platonic thought really taught about the issue of determinism.



What some others had to say about it in passing:

FromA critique of Plotinian Neoplatonism in quoting the Reformed scholar and presuppositionalist Cornelius Van Til in his work A Christian Theory of Knowledge (1969)

Quote:
"In complete contrast to this approach of Plotinus stands that of Augustine. To be sure, as noted, Augustine makes many a concession to the apostate point of view of logic. But at bottom his commitment is to the idea that man is the creature of God rather than participant in the being of God. In spite of his many concessions to the Greek paideia his main principle, as best expressed in his latest works, is that sovereign God gives or withholds his grace to sinners according to his good pleasure. Therefore if those who operate from a Plotinian point of view charge him with determinism Augustine, following Paul, simply responds: "Who art thou O man that contendest with God." The judge of the whole earth will do right. Man, the creature, become the sinner, must admit mystery, but the mystery that he admits does not, as in the case of Plotinus, envelop God.

Still consonant with the basic contrast between Plotinus and Augustine on the question of the final point of reference and also consonant with the difference between them on the question of logic is their difference with respect to the philosophy of fact.

For Plotinus the world of space-time factuality exists by Chance. His principle of individuation is that of pure contingency and irrationality. Over against this purely contingent and and purely irrational principle of individuality is the idea of Augustine that God, having created all things, having sent Christ to redeem the world, directs all things to the end appointed for them by himself. In spite of all the concessions that he makes to the Plotinian principle, especially in his earlier works, it is none the less true of Augustine that his basic commitment, best expressed in his later writings, is that the facts of reality are what they are, ultimately, by virtue of the all-encompassing plan of God."

In the chapter "A Plotinian vehicle for a Manichaen notion":
The link: (pages 85 to 87 and on page 13 he mentions his use of Plotinus in writing against Manichaenism as well)
Augustine, Manichaeism and the Good by Kam-Lun E. Lee









Christ is Risen!

[1] page 370, from the book "GNOSIS:The Nature & History of Gnosticism" by Kurt Rudolph, and translation edited by Robert McLachlan Wilson 1984/1987 HarperSanFrancisco / HarperCollins publishers

This is from the Orthodoxchristianity.net forum.

Re: Prevenient Grace (Arminianism) And Eastern Orthodoxy « Reply #7 on: April 24, 2010, 06:53:01 PM »

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I found this to be very helpful in regards to our view: http://ancientfaith.com/podcasts/podup/illuminedheart/god_essence_and_energies (GOD: Essence and Energies) It relates to the topic at hand. Christ is Risen!

I found out about this from the Examining Calvinism blog. It's a dissertation by Kam-Lun E. Lee



As seen from the dissertation website:
"This thesis will investigate, by means of the historical-critical method, Augustine of Hippo's understanding of the Manichaean idea of the Good, and how this understanding affects his own related notions of summum bonum and personal evil, and, as a corollary, his doctrine of predestination. The question of a possible Manichaean influence is particularly pertinent because Manichaeism is at heart a dualistic solution to the issue of good and evil. The focus is not on Manichaeism per se but on Augustine's perception of it, as more directly affecting his thinking.
Augustine's treatise De natura boni (399) in part summarizes his treatment of "the nature of the Good" in earlier polemics. From his first writing, De pulchro et apto (380), to that point, Augustine understands the Manichaean concept as equating the Good with the Beautiful, the latter taken to mean that which engenders tranquil pleasure. Conversely, evil is thought of as a disturbance of this state, whether spiritually or physically.

Carrying over from the Manichaean expectations he held in De pulchro et apto, Augustine perceives the summum bonum to be that which guarantees the soul's tranquil enjoyment. For the soul to attain tranquility, it must have modus, or the fullness of due order. God as the summum bonum can guarantee tranquility simply because, as summus modus, he exists fully, therefore cannot be lost as the soul's object of possession. In turn, God confers order on the contemplating soul.

Wickedness and mortality are deemed to be both spiritually and physically evil in Manichaean terms because they disturb a person's tranquil existence. In his non-metaphysical theory he designs to explain intrinsic personal evil developed in De uera religione (390), Augustine redefines these two notions as "sin" and "penalty," hence imposing on them a causal relation that makes the conception of a vicious circle mechanism possible. According to Augustine, in the human experience of evil habit (consuetudo), the mystery of one's bondage to sin, has to do with the vicious circle caused by the inherited penalty of the primal sin, resulting in bodily corruption, and by the effect of this corruption on the subsequent sinful defective turning of the will away from God toward preference for bodily pleasure. This defection is, in turn, reinforced by spiritual blindness, which is, again, the result of bodily corruption. In his debate with Fortunatus (392), Augustine was challenged to reread the Pauline writings. From this he discovered that his theory of consuetudo remained incomplete so long as no serious consideration was given to the role of concupiscentia as the intrinsic principle of rebellion against God's Law. Augustine's notion of concupiscentia is also linked directly to the Manichaean idea of evil as a disturbance of a person's inner tranquility. By the time he wrote De uera religione, Augustine had imported into that notion a strong sexual overtone by equating concupiscentia with the Manichaean term libido, which implies sexual desire.

Augustine's development of the idea of predestination reveals the Manichaean concept of the Good at work in three ways: on the framework of that development, in the implication of determinism, and on the context of the doctrine. To respond to the Manichaean view of the universe as a mixture of good and evil, Augustine suggests an alternative theory of cosmic ordering. Despite the presence of evil, he believes that the whole cosmos is in harmonious beauty so long as evil is assigned to its proper place. God is to preserve this order in both the physical and the spiritual (moral) creations, an order portrayable with a two-tiered frame. Initially (around 388), Augustine thought that an individual person, as a spiritual creature, should have self-determination by the exercise of the will. But gradually, due to his conviction that personal evil is inevitable (a view shared by the Manichees and demonstrated in his conceptions of consuetudo and concupiscentia), Augustine assigned determination of one's destiny to the jurisdiction of God."

To read the rest, please visit the link.








ICXC NIKA

I bought this book in the 1990's. I liked it back then, but over the years I started disliking it. I would often find myself arguing with some of the views of the author. Eventually I lost track of the book for some years only to find it again, and dispite the fact that I no longer like the book, and disagree with the Modernist tendencies of the author. I still liked what he had to say about Jansenism. It's hard to find any info about him online, so I decided to put this up.


pages 171-174

"Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638), Catholic Bishop of Ypres from 1635, founded a heresy of major importance in the seventeenth century in the shape of a genuinely religous movement which demanded strictness in living and morals at a time of general laxity. It arose from his book, Augustinus, a commentary on the works of St. Augustine published posthumously in 1640. Jansen wrote that the full Christian life was possible only in the Roman Catholic Church and rejected justification by faith, but he emphasized personal religious experience and the direct contact of a man with God in sudden conversation. His book was alleged to contain five heretical propositions (Calvinistic in their emphasis on the predestination to salvation of the Elect), which were condemned by the Pope and the Inquisition in 1653.
These were as follows:
1. Some of God's commands are impossible for just men wanting and struggling to keep them, considering the powers human beings actually posses. The grace by which these commandments can be kept may also be withheld.
2. In the state of fallen nature, interior grace once granted is irresistible.
3. In the state of fallen nature, to merit or deserve punishment men need not be free from interior necessity but only from exterior constraint.
4. The semi-Pelagians, though admitting a necessity of interior preventing (i.e. prevenient or initiated by God) grace for all acts, grace may be either followed or resisted.
5. To say that Christ died for all men is semi-Pelagian.

In simple language, Jansenism asserted the power and majesty of God, the insignificance of man and the necessity of grace as against the Jesuits who, in the view of Jansenists, allowed free will and works to play too big a part in the scheme of salvation. Pascal, whose Provincial Letters was written to defend the Jansenists, wrote in his Pensees that 'we understand nothing of the works of God, if we do not take it as our starting- point that he willed to blind some, to enlighten others' (iii. 6). It also stressed the need for a more rigid, puritanical morality disapproving of the Jesuits' laxity in demanding too little penance from their penitents. Jansenist churches lacked flowers, decoration and music, and all other things in life were considered trivia compared with the facts of the corruption of man, the reality and awfulness of God andman's redemption by Christ. Like some moderate Protestants, the 'heresy' upheld the authority of Scripture and of the early ecumenical councils against later developments in the Church, and it emphasized the importance of education. It was condemned for wanting to return to a primitive purity and discipline which differed from the accepted doctrines an practices of its day and which, Catholic critics allege, could have been dangerous in the conditions of the seventeenth century. It is not cynical to say, too, that its high ideals and standards troubled the consciences of, and consequently exasperated, its opponents.

The heresy was supported by Port-Royal, near Paris, a community of Cistercian nuns and solitaries governed by Mere Angelique Arnauld. When the five propositions were condemned in 1653, Dr. Antoine Arnauld, a relative of Mere Angeliquw, denied that they appeared in the Augustinus at all, and that later went further in asserting that, although the Pope can define a doctrine and condemn a heresy opposing it, he cannot infallibly declare such heresy to be contained in any individual book. The controversy was intensified by political enemies of the French government and the Jesuits, who used the movement as a stick with which to beat their opponents. The papal condemnation was renewed in 1661 and a general assembly of French clergy endorsed an anti-Jansenist formula, which all clergy were reguired to sign. Four years later the Pope published a similar formula. under it four bishops were excommunicated, but the other bishops rallied to them and compromise was reached. Meanwhile some of the supporters of Jansenism were affected by a curious hysteria. Upon the death of the Jansenist cleric, Francois, Archdeacon of Paris, his tomb in St. Medard's Cemetery became a centre of pilgrimage and alleged miracles. Excess broke out among the Convulsionnaires, as they came to be known. Among them were gently nurtured young ladies who witnessed to the glory of God and the justice of the Jansenist cause by eating excreta, allowing paving-stones to be broken on their stomachs and speaking in tongues. Encourages, perhaps by such devotion, the nuns of Port-Royal persisted as s result. Louis XIV, urged on by the Jesuits, asked the Pope for an unequivocal pronouncement on Jansenism. In 1705, therefore, a papal bull condemned Jansenism for the third time in terms which left no doubt that it was heretical. The nuns still refusing to submit, Port Royal was closed, its buildings destroyed and its graveyard ploughed up.

This ended the matter for a few years. In 1713, however, a book by Quesnel, Moral Reflections on the New Testament, was swiftly condemned by a papal bull, Unigenitus, for 101 Jansenist propositions contained in it. The Parlement of Paris was a strong supporter of Jansenism and the French Church resented the bull as an interference with its internal affairs. Nevertheless, there was persecution and some Jansenists fled to the Netherlands, where several thousands of Catholics, both clerics and laymen, broke with Rome and helped to form the Dutch Old Catholic Church. this came into existence as follows.

Since Jansenism had originated in Holland, the Dutch bishops were suspect; and in 1670 the Archbishop of Utrecht was summoned to Rome to answer a charge of heresy. He returned uncondemned, but in 1710 the Archbishop-elect, selected by the chapter, was excommunicated for protesting against a summons to appear before a papal nuncio at Colegne, After thirteen years' limbo, however, on 15 October 1724, Cornelius Steenoven was consecrated Archbishop, in due line of Apostolic succession, by Bishop of Babylon, whereupon the Old Catholic Church of Holland began a separate existence, one which still continues. Jansenism also survived in France but almost entirely politically and without its original idealism. The conflict it caused has, in fact, led to the accusation that it formented the spirit of atheism and the anti-religion which helped to bring about the French Revolution.. [1]



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Is Calvinism one step away from Atheism?





JNORM888

[1] pages 171-174 from the book "A history of Heresy" by David Christie-Murray

Eventhough alot of modern Arminians (what some might call popular Arminianism) don't believe in what is called "Total inability". Classical Arminians and Weslyian Arminians do, and this is what alot of Calvinists don't know when they talk about Arminianism. Many of them assume that Arminianism in general rejects "Total inability".





In this audio, the conservative Methodist scholar and associate pastor Dr. Vic Reasoner talks a little bit about the history of Arminianism (what some might call classical Arminianism) and it's close cousin "Weslyian Arminianism". He also lectures on the points where Weslyian Arminianism agree and disagree with Calvinism.
In the audio, you will hear him distance Arminianism from both Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism. In the western christian World, "Semi-Pelagianism" is seen as a bad thing, because of the local second council of Orange, (Eventhough it's not an Eucemenical Council) and this is one of the reasons why you will hear some Arminians talk against it. The other reason is because Calvinists will try to associate Arminianism with Pelagius or Semi-Pelagianism, and since "Semi-Pelagianism" is seen as the boogieman, there is a guilt by association. To be honest, it would be more accurate to call Arminianism "Semi-Augustinianism" for they embrace the free will views of Augustine's early years, but they also embrace the Total inability of Augustine's Later years.
Calvinism only embraces Augustine's later teachings.

So don't be offended when you hear "some" Arminians say bad things about Semi-Pelagianism. Protestantism in general comes from Roman Catholicism so it carries some of the same attitude and mood as Rome (on certain issues).



Play Part 1

Play Part 2




JNORM888

Ben, over at Arminian Perspectives did a great post about Augustine and Free will.

http://arminianperspectives.wordpress.com/2008/04/29/augustine-the-libertarian/

"Some refer to Calvinism as Augustinianism. John
Calvin took the teachings of the later Augustine and systematized them.
The only major difference between the later Augustine and Calvin’s theology is
the doctrine of perseverance. Augustine believed that one could be truly
regenerated and yet not be granted the gift of perseverance. Calvin denied
that one who was truly regenerated could fail to persevere. But what about
the early Augustine?
The early Augustine had a theology that was little
different than the theology which had dominated the church since apostolic
teachings. Augustine held to a libertarian view of human freedom and only
began to move away from that view when embroiled in debate and controversy with
the Pelagians. In these debates his theology began to shift.
Calvinists
might claim that this shift was due to theological maturity and greater insight
into Biblical truths once overlooked. Another possibility is that when
trying to counter the Pelagian arguments regarding free will Augustine went too
far in the other direction and began to fall back into some of the gnostic
determinism which he had abandoned upon his conversion to Christianity from
the Manichaean sect. Augustine’s later redevelopment of much of
his theology was the direct result this overreaction to the Pelagian
controversy. I prefer the latter explanation.
So what did the early
Augustine believe concerning the will? He agreed with the consensus
of the chruch Fathers before him. He held to a libertarian view of
free will and argued for it along the same lines as many Arminians do
today.
Compatibilists often tell us we are “free” if we are not
coerced by external factors and do what we “want” to do.
The part that they often leave out of the conversation is that they believe that
our “wants” are causally determined by internal factors"

Read the rest at his blog




JNORM888

Augustine lived from the years 354 A.D. to about the year 430 A.D. These quotes are going to be a mixture from different periods of his life.


Augustine admits having a change of mind after receiving a revelation from reading a quote of 1st Corinthians 4:7 in one of the works of Cyprian.




"It was not thus that that pious and humble teacher thought—I speak of the most blessed Cyprian—when he said "-->that we must boast in nothing, since nothing is our own."-->15-3432--> And in order to show this, he appealed to the apostle as a witness, where he said, "-->For what have you that you have not received? And if you have received it, why do you boast as if you had not received it?"--> 1 Corinthians 4:7 And it was chiefly by this testimony that I myself also was convinced when I was in a similar error, thinking that faith whereby we believe in God is not God's gift, but that it is in us from ourselves, and that by it we obtain the gifts of God, whereby we may live temperately and righteously and piously in this world. For I did not think that faith was preceded by God's grace, so that by its means would be given to us what we might profitably ask, except that we could not believe if the proclamation of the truth did not precede; but that we should consent when the gospel was preached to us I thought was our own doing, and came to us from ourselves. And this my error is sufficiently indicated in some small works of mine written before my episcopate. Among these is that which you have mentioned in your letters15-3434--> wherein is an exposition of certain propositions from the Epistle to the Romans."

On the Predestination of the Saints (Book I) chapter 7 (around the year 428 A.D.)
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/15121.htm



Augustine seemed to have had a change of mind over the years in regards to the condemnation of infants.


"Therefore it is in vain that it is prescribed to me from that old book of mine, that I may not argue the case as I ought to argue it in respect of infants; and that thence I may not persuade my opponents by the light of a manifest truth, that God's grace is not given according to men's merits. For if, when I began my books con537 -->cerning Free Will as a layman, and finished them as a presbyter, I still doubted of the condemnation of infants not born again, and of the deliverance of infants that were born again, no one, as I think, would be so unfair and envious as to hinder my progress, and judge that I must continue in that uncertainty. But it can more correctly be understood that it ought to be believed that I did not doubt in that matter, for the reason that they against whom my purpose was directed seemed to me in such wise to be rebutted, as that whether there was a punishment of original sin in infants, according to the truth, or whether there was not, as some mistaken people think, yet in no degree should such a confusion of the two natures be believed in, to wit, of good and evil, as the error of the Manicheans introduces. Be it therefore far from us so to forsake the case of infants as to say to ourselves that it is uncertain whether, being regenerated in Christ, if they die in infancy they pass into eternal salvation; but that, not being regenerated, they pass into the second death. Because that which is written, "-->By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men,"--> Romans 5:12 cannot be rightly understood in any other manner; nor from that eternal death which is most righteously repaid to sin does any deliver any one, small or great, save He who, for the sake of remitting our sins, both original and personal, died without any sin of His own, either original or personal. But why some rather than others? Again and again we say, and do not shrink from it, "-->O man, who are you that repliest against God?"--> Romans 9:20 "-->His judgments are unsearchable, and His ways past finding out."--> Romans 11:33 And let us add this, "-->Seek not out the things that are too high for you, and search not the things that are above your strength."--> Sirach 3:21"


On the Predestination of the Saints (Book II) chapter 30 (around the year 428 A.D.)
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/15122.htm



Taken from one of his later works. I'm gonna eventually compare this to an earlier work of his.


"And, moreover, who will be so foolish and blasphemous as to say that God cannot change the evil wills of men, whichever, whenever, and wheresoever He chooses, and direct them to what is good? But when He does this He does it of mercy; when He does it not, it is of justice that He does it not for "-->He has mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens."-->13-1279--> And when the apostle said this, he was illustrating the grace of God,"


Enchiridion(The Handbook on Faith, Hope and Love)chapter 98 (around the year 421 A.D.)
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1302.htm



Augustine is trying to argue that God over rules the wills of men if he wants someone to be saved.



"Hence we must inquire in what sense is said of God what the apostle has mostly truly said: "-->Who will have all men to be saved."-->13-1277--> For, as a matter of fact, not all, nor even a majority, are saved: so that it would seem that what God wills is not done, man's will interfering with, and hindering the will of God. When we ask the reason why all men are not saved, the ordinary answer is: "-->Because men 268 -->themselves are not willing."--> This, indeed cannot be said of infants, for it is not in their power either to will or not to will. But if we could attribute to their will the childish movements they make at baptism, when they make all the resistance they can, we should say that even they are not willing to be saved. Our Lord says plainly, however, in the Gospel, when upbraiding the impious city: "-->How often would I have gathered your children together, even as a hen gathers her chickens under her wings, and you would not!"-->13-1278--> as if the will of God had been overcome by the will of men, and when the weakest stood in the way with their want of will, the will of the strongest could not be carried out. And where is that omnipotence which has done all that it pleased on earth and in heaven, if God willed to gather together the children of Jerusalem, and did not accomplish it? or rather, Jerusalem was not willing that her children should be gathered together? But even though she was unwilling, He gathered together as many of her children as He wished: for He does not will some things and do them, and will others and do them not; but "-->He has done all that He pleased in heaven and in earth."-->"


Enchiridion(The Handbook on Faith, Hope and Love) chapter 97 (around the year 421 A.D.)



In the work called "On the Spirit and the letter" Augustine leaves a little bit of room for free will. Or human consent.

Quote:"it surely follows that it is God who both works in man the willing to believe, and in all things prevents us with His mercy. To yield our consent, indeed, to God's summons, or to withhold it, is (as I have said) the function of our own will. And this not only does not invalidate what is said, "For what do you have that you did not receive?" 1 Corinthians 4:7 but it really confirms it. For the soul cannot receive and possess these gifts, which are here referred to, except by yielding its consent."

On the Spirit and the Letter Chapter 57 (around the year 412 A.D.)
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1502.htm




In this early work of Augustine he seems to embrace free will. Or that an unwilling person can't be forced to be willing.

"For every one also who does a thing unwillingly is compelled, and every one who is compelled, if he does a thing, does it only unwillingly. It follows that he that is willing is free from compulsion, even if any one thinks himself compelled. And in this manner every one who willingly does a thing is not compelled, and whoever is not compelled, either does it willingly or not at all. Since nature itself proclaims these things in all men whom we can interrogate without absurdity, from the boy even to the old man, from literary sport even to the throne of the wise, why then should I not have seen that in the definition of will should be put, "no one compelling," which now as if with greater experience most cautiously I have done. But if this is everywhere manifest, and promptly occurs to all not by instruction but by nature, what is there left that seems obscure, unless perchance it be concealed from some one, that when we wish for something, we will, and our mind is moved towards it, and we either have it or do not have it, and if we have it we will to retain it, if we have it not, to acquire it? Wherefore everyone who wills, wills either not to lose something or to obtain it. Hence if all these things are clearer than day, as they are, nor are they given to my conception alone, but by the liberality of truth itself to the whole human race, why could I not have said even at that time: Will is a movement of the mind, no one compelling, either for not losing or for obtaining something?"

Of Two Souls Chapter 10 verse 14 (around the 391 A.D.)
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1403.htm


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hhhhhh



more to be edited.......to be continued.




JNOrm888

One of the differences between Augustinianism and Calvinism deals with the last point of the T.U.L.I.P.

The "P" or Perseverence of the Saints.

Saint Augustine's early works would be more in line with semi-pelagianism and Arminianism, whereas his later works would seem more in line with Calvinism.

Some Calvinists would claim that Augustinianism was nothing more than Calvinism before the time of John Calvin. But that's not 100%ly true.


It is said that in Augustinian theology there is an "election" to grace(initial salvation) and an "election" to glory(final salvation).


In other words. ....all of the "regenerate" are elected to grace, but not all of the "regenerate" will be elected to glory.


I might be wrong but I think this is what Saint Augustine tought.


On the otherhand you have Calvinism and this is where Calvinism breaks from Augustinianism.


In Calvinism you have a theology called "the golden chain" or "the unbroken chain". And according to them the last set of verses found in Romans chapter 8 supports the idea that everyone who is elected to grace(initial salvation) will be elected to glory(final salvation).


In other words. All of the regenerated who are elected to grace will also be elected to glory.


And this is why Calvinists and psuedo-calvinists are not able to understand John chapter 15, Romans chapter 11, and Hebrews chapter 6 the way everybody else does.

They are always reading the "golden chain" into these chapters.





ICXC JNORM888

I will first look at the Works of John Cassian and show what "real" semi-pelagianism was and wasn't. I will also compare his works to the canons of the council of Orange. Then I will look at some of the works of Augustine as well as one from Arminius to show the differences of the two systems. Alot of people in the west like to bash Semi-pelagianism, but what they don't know is Most of what John Cassian had to say about the issue of free will and grace was 100% sound christian teaching. The differences between the two systems isn't major, but their is a difference that does exist.



Taken from his constitutionshttp://www.osb.org/lectio/cassian/co...onf3.html#3.11

Quote:
CHAPTER XIV.That knowledge of the law is given by the guidance and
illumination of the Lord.THE knowledge also of the law itself they daily
endeavour to gain not by diligence in reading, but by the guidance and
illumination of God as they say to Him: "Show me Thy ways, O Lord, and teach me
Thy paths:" and "open Thou mine eyes: and I shall see the wondrous things of Thy
law:" and "teach me to do Thy will, for Thou art my God;" and again: "Who
teacheth man knowledge."

This quote by him is 100% orthodox

Quote:
CHAPTER XIII.That the ordering of our way comes from God.AND truly the
saints have never said that it was by their own efforts that they secured the
direction of the way in which they walked in their course towards advance and
perfection of virtue, but rather they prayed for it from the Lord, saying
"Direct me in Thy truth," and "direct my way in thy sight." But someone else
declares that he discovered this very fact not only by faith, but also by
experience, and as it were from the very nature of things: "I know, O Lord, that
the way of man is not his: neither is it in a man to walk and to direct his
steps." And the Lord Himself says to Israel: "I will direct him like a green
fir-tree: from Me is thy fruit found."

This is also 100%ly orthodox

Quote:
CHAPTER XI.A question on the free will of man and the grace of
God.GERMANUS: Where then is there room for free will, and how is it ascribed to
our efforts that we are worthy of praise, if God both begins and ends everything
in us which concerns our salvation?

This is also 100%ly something the western church embraces.

Quote:
CHAPTER XV.That the understanding, by means of which we can recognize
God's commands, and the performance of a good will are both gifts from the
Lord.FURTHER the blessed David asks of the Lord that he may gain that very
understanding, by which he can recognize God's commands which, he well knew,
were written in the book of the law, and he says "I am Thy servant: O give me
understanding that I may learn Thy commandments." Certainly he was in possession
of understanding, which had been granted to him by nature, and also had at his
fingers' ends a knowledge of God's commands which were preserved in writing in
the law: and still he prayed the Lord that he might learn this more thoroughly
as he knew that what came to him by nature would never be sufficient for him,
unless his understanding was enlightened by the Lord by a daily illumination
from Him, to understand the law spiritually and to recognize His commands more
clearly, as the "chosen vessel" also declares very plainly this which we are
insisting on. "For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do
according to good will." What could well be clearer than the assertion that both
our good will and the completion of our work are fully wrought in us by the
Lord? And again "For it is granted to you for Christ's sake, not only to believe
in Him but also to suffer for Him." Here also he declares that the beginning of
our conversion and faith, and the endurance of suffering is a gift to us from
the Lord. And David too, as he knows this, similarly prays that the same thing
may be granted to him by God's mercy. "Strengthen, O God, that which Thou hast
wrought in us:" showing that it is not enough for the beginning of our salvation
to be granted by the gift and grace of God, unless it has been continued and
ended by the same pity and continual help from Him. For not free will but the
Lord "looseth them that are bound." No strength of ours, but the Lord "raiseth
them that are fallen:" no diligence in reading, but "the Lord enlightens the
blind:" where the Greeks have kurioV sofoi tuflouV, i.e., "the Lord maketh wise
the blind:" no care on our part, but "the Lord careth for the stranger:" no
courage of ours, but "the Lord assists (or supports) all those who are down."
But this we say, not to slight our zeal and efforts and diligence, as if they
were applied unnecessarily and foolishly, but that we may know that we cannot
strive without the help of God, nor can our efforts be of any use in securing
the great reward of purity, unless it has been granted to us by the assistance
and mercy of the Lord: for "a horse is prepared for the day of battle: but help
cometh from the Lord," "for no man can prevail by strength." We ought then
always to sing with the blessed David: "My strength and my praise is" not my
free will, but "the Lord, and He is become my salvation." And the teacher of the
Gentiles was not ignorant of this when he declared that he was made capable of
the ministry of the New Testament not by his own merits or efforts but by the
mercy of God. "Not" says he, "that we are capable of thinking anything of
ourselves as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God," which can be put in
less good Latin but more forcibly, "our capability is of God," and then there
follows: "Who also made us capable ministers of the New Testament."

This is pretty sound.





Ok now we are going to look at what got my boy in trouble.

In the book John Cassian: conferences, translated by and prefaced by Colm Luibheid and introduction by Owen Chadwick page 27


Chadwick says

"But -to the soul totally helpless? The prodical son was sick of the husks the
swine ate, and turned homeward. And while he was still a great way off, his
father saw him and ran to meet him. Are there cases - perhaps rare cases- where
the first tiny initiative comes from the soul turning back because sick of
husks, and then God comes with his saving grace to help?To this question Cassian
answered yes, There are cases-they may be very rare cases-where the soul makes
the first little turn. Might the theif on the cross be one such? And because
Cassian answered yes to this question, he almost destroyed his reputation as a
theologian.For if Cassian is right, said the critics, we are not helpless
without God. Cassian may say we are helpless. He cannot mean it. We need not
enter this controversy of the centuries. It will be sufficient to say here: (1)
No one can doubt that Cassian disapproved of the doctrine of Saint Augustine. He
thought it rigid. He thought parts of it untrue. He wrote one conference, the
thirteenth, to confute Saint Augustine. (2) No one can doubt that Cassian was a
deeply Christian moralist and never for an instant supposed that a soul could
ascend any ladder, or fight any fight, without God pouring in His grace."

John Cassian speculated that some people were able to take the first steps to God.


Now lets go to where he said it.http://www.osb.org/lectio/cassian/conf/book2/conf13.html#13.12In conference 13 chapter 12 he says

Quote:
"For because the faith of the thief on the cross came as the first thing, no one would say that therefore the blessed abode of Paradise was not promised to him as a free gift, nor could we hold that it was the penitence of King David's single word which he uttered: "I have sinned against the Lord," and not rather the mercy of God which removed those two grievous sins of his, so that it was vouchsafed to him to hear from the prophet Nathan: "The Lord also hath put away thine iniquity: thou shalt not die."

The council of Orange was against the idea of the thief taking the first step to God. They also thought that the will of King David had to be prepared by God in order for him to pray to God.

and this quote from chapter 11


Quote:
CHAPTER XI.Whether the grace of God precedes or follows our good will.AND so these are somehow mixed up and indiscriminately confused, so that among many persons, which depends on the other is involved in great questionings, i.e., does God have compassion upon us because we have shown the beginning of a good will, or does the beginning of a good will follow because God has had compassion upon us? For many believing each of these and asserting them more widely than is right are entangled in all kinds of opposite errors. For if we say that the beginning of free will is in our own power, what about Paul the persecutor, what about Matthew the publican, of whom the one was drawn to salvation while eager for bloodshed and the punishment of the innocent, the other for violence and rapine? But if we say that the beginning of our free will is always due to the inspiration of the grace of God, what about the faith of Zaccheus, or what are we to say of the goodness of the thief on the cross, who by their own desires brought violence to bear on the kingdom of heaven and so prevented the special leadings of their vocation? But if we attribute the performance of virtuous acts, and the execution of God's commands to our own will, how do we pray: "Strengthen, O God, what Thou hast wrought in us;" and "The work of our hands stablish Thou upon us"? We know that Balaam was brought to curse Israel, but we see that when he wished to curse he was not permitted to. Abimelech is preserved from touching Rebecca and so sinning against God. Joseph is sold by the envy of his brethren, in order to bring about the descent of the children of Israel into Egypt, and that while they were contemplating the death of their brother provision might be made for them against the famine to come: as Joseph shows when he makes himself known to his brethren and says: "Fear not, neither let it be grievous unto you that ye sold me into these parts: for for your salvation God sent me before you;" and below: "For God sent me before that ye might be preserved upon the earth and might have food whereby to live. Not by your design was I sent but by the will of God, who has made me a father to Pharaoh and lord of all his house, and chief over all the land of Egypt." And when his brethren were alarmed after the death of his father, he removed their suspicions and terror by saying: "Fear not: Can ye resist the will of God? You imagined evil against me but God turned it into good, that He might exalt me, as ye see at the present time, that He might save much people." And that this was brought about providentially the blessed David likewise declare saying in the hundred and fourth Psalm: "And He called for a dearth upon the land: and brake all the staff of bread. He sent a man before them: Joseph was sold for a slave." These two then; viz., the grace of God and free will seem opposed to each other, but really are in harmony, and we gather from the system of goodness that we ought to have both alike, lest if we withdraw one of them from man, we may seem to have broken the rule of the Church's faith: for when God sees us inclined to will what is good, He meets, guides, and strengthens us: for "At the voice of thy cry, as soon as He shall hear, He will answer thee;" and: "Call upon Me," He says, "in the day of tribulation and I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify Me." And again, if He finds that we are unwilling or have grown cold, He stirs our hearts with salutary exhortations, by which a good will is either renewed or formed in us.


This is why Canon 8 of Orange said

http://the-highway.com/Orange.html


Quote:
"CANON 8. If anyone maintains that some are able to come to the grace of baptism by mercy but others through free will, which has manifestly been corrupted in all those who have been born after the transgression of the first man, it is proof that he has no place in the true faith. For he denies that the free will of all men has been weakened through the sin of the first man, or at least holds that it has been affected in such a way that they have still the ability to seek the mystery of eternal salvation by themselves without the revelation of God. The Lord himself shows how contradictory this is by declaring that no one is able to come to him "unless the Father who sent me draws him" (John 6:44), as he also says to Peter, "Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jona! For flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven" (Matt. 16:17), and as the Apostle says, "No one can say 'Jesus is Lord' except by the Holy Spirit" (1 Cor. 12:3)."

Orange also said in regards to Cassian and his followers


Quote:
"We also believe and confess to our benefit that in every good work it is not we who take the initiative and are then assisted through the mercy of God, but God himself first inspires in us both faith in him and love for him without any previous good works of our own that deserve reward, so that we may both faithfully seek the sacrament of baptism, and after baptism be able by his help to do what is pleasing to him. We must therefore most evidently believe that the praiseworthy faith of the thief whom the Lord called to his home in paradise, and of Cornelius the centurion, to whom the angel of the Lord was sent, and of Zacchaeus, who was worthy to receive the Lord himself, was not a natural endowment but a gift of God's kindness."


As you can see Those over the council of Orange wanted grace to preceed every human action.Orange did not condemn our co-operation after initial grace and it doesn't condemn those portions of co-operation after initial grace found in the works of John Cassian either.Infact this statement from Orange shows that we do co-operate with God after initial grace


Quote:
"According to the catholic faith we also believe that after grace has been received through baptism, all baptized persons have the ability and responsibility, if they desire to labor faithfully, to perform with the aid and cooperation of Christ what is of essential importance in regard to the salvation of their soul. We not only do not believe that any are foreordained to evil by the power of God, but even state with utter abhorrence that if there are those who want to believe so evil a thing, they are anathema."


Everything John Cassian said about synergy wasn't condemned in the canons of the council of Orange. The onlything the council wanted to show was that grace must preceed everything before any co-operation is done. So co-operation in and of itself is not "error"! So I think some people think that everything John Cassian said or that everything his followers said about free will and grace must of been wrong and that's not the case. The canons of the council of Orange didn't condemn everything he had to say about the topic.



Augustine once believed in something "similar" to the semi-pelagians.

http://www.catholicity.com/encyclope...lagianism.html


Quote:
"The aged Augustine gathered all his remaining strength to prevent the revival of Pelagianism which had then been hardly overcome. He addressed (428 or 429) to Prosper and Hilarius the two works "De prædestinatione sanctorum" (P. L., XLIV, 959 sqq.) and "De dono perseverantiæ" (P. L., XLIV, 993 sqq.). In refuting their errors, Augustine treats his opponents as erring friends, not as heretics, and humbly adds that, before his episcopal consecration (about 396), he himself had been caught in a "similar error", until a passage in the writings of St. Paul (I Cor., iv, 7) had opened his eyes, "thinking that the faith, by which we believe in God, is not the gift of God, but is in us of ourselves, and that through it we obtain the gifts whereby we may live temperately, justly, and piously in this world" (De prædest. sanct., iii, 7). The Massilians, however, remained unappeased, the last writings of Augustine making no impression upon them. Offended at this obstinacy, Prosper believed the time had arrived for public polemics. He first described the new state of the question in a letter to a certain Rufinus (Prosper Aquit., "Ep. ad Rufinum de gratia et libero arbitrio", in P. L., XLI 77 sqq.), lashed in a poem of some thousand hexameters (Peri achariston, "hoc est de ingratis", in P.L., LI, 91 sqq.) the ingratitude of the "enemies of grace", and directed against an unnamed assailant - perhaps Cassian himself - his "Epigrammata in obtrectatorem Augustini" (P. L., XLI, 149 sqq.), written in clegiacs. At the time of the composition of this poem (429-30), Augustine was still alive."

I don't have all of Augustines early works. I only have some of them so I wasn't able to trace the source of the quote.However, to one of the intro notes of the book I do have says this:

"“It is true, of course, that there was development in St. Augustine's thought, and that his ordination marks an important stage in it................... In the retractions St. Augustine himself marks the division between his early and later writings. That work is in two books, of which the former reviews his writings previous to his elevations to the episcopate in 395/6; and the second begins with a review of his answers to the questions of Simplicianus, written “at the beginning of my episcopate.” To this work he frequently refers later as setting forth his final understanding of the Pauline doctrine of grace. Here if anywhere we may choose to fix the point at which the “earlier” gives place to the “later” Augustine, remembering that any such choice is somewhat arbitrary.”

From the book “Augustine: Earlier Writings” edited by J.H.S. Burleigh page 13 & 14

Also we can see it in his commentary to the book of Romans

Quote:
"Having given his conclusion [in the last verse] Paul plays devil's advocate by asking arhetorical question........He responds to this question in a sensible way so that we might understand that the basic rewards of faith and of unbelief are made plain only to spiritual people and not to those who live according to the earthly man. Likewise with the way God in his foreknowledge elects those who will believe and condemns unbelievers. He neither elects the ones because of their works nor condemns the other because of theirs, but he grants to the faith of the ones the ability to do good works and hardens the unbelief of the others by deserting them, so that they do evil. This understanding, as I have said, is given only to spiritual people and is very different from the wisdom of the flesh. Thus Paul counters his inquirer so that he may understand that he first must put away the man of clay in order to be worthy to investigate these things by the Spirit."

Augustine on Romans from the book Ancient Christian commentary on scripture: New Testament VI Romans edited by Gerald Bray page 259and

Quote:
"We read in Exodus[10:1] that Pharaoh's heart was hardened, so that he was not moved even by clear signs. Therefore, because Pharaoh did not obey the commands of God he was punished. No one can say that this hardness of heart came upon Pharaoh undeservedly; it came by the judgment of God who was giving him just punishment for his unbelief. Nor should it be thought that Pharaoh did not obey because he could not, on the ground that his heart had already been hardened. On the contrary, Pharaoh had deserved his hardness of by his earlier unbelief. For in those whom God has chosen it is not works but faith which is the beginning of merit, so that they might do good works by the gift of God. And in those whom he condemns unbelief and unfaithfulness are the beginning of punishment, so that by that very punishment they are permitted to do what is evil."

Augustine on Romans from the book Ancient Christian commentary on scripture: New Testament VI Romans edited by Gerald Bray page 257 I don't see how Faith can be seen as a merit but Augustine and Ambrose thought it was. And

Quote:
"Paul does not take away the freedom of the will but says that our will is not sufficient unless God helps us, making us compassionate so that we might do good works by the gift of the Holy Spirit.....We cannot will unless we are called, and when we will after our calling neither our will nor our striving is enough unless God gives strength to our striving and leads us where he calls. It is therefore clear that it is not by willing nor by striving but by the mercy of God that we do good works, even though our will (which by itself can do nothing) is also present."

Augustine on Romans from the book Ancient Christian commentary on scripture: New Testament VI Romans edited by Gerald Bray page 256

http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1502.htm

Quote:
"Chapter 57 [XXXIII.]—Whence Comes the Will to Believe?But it remains for us briefly to inquire, Whether the will by which we believe be itself the gift of God, or whether it arise from that free will which is naturally implanted in us? If we say that it is not the gift of God, we must then incur the fear of supposing that we have discovered some answer to the apostle's reproachful appeal: "What do you have that you did not receive? Now, if you received it, why do you glory, as if you had not received it?" 1 Corinthians 4:7 —even some such an answer as this: "See, we have the will to believe, which we did not receive. See in what we glory,—even in what we did not receive!" If, however, we were to say that this kind of will is nothing but the gift of God, we should then have to fear lest unbelieving and ungodly men might not unreasonably seem to have some fair excuse for their unbelief, in the fact that God has refused to give them this will. Now this that the apostle says, "It is God that works in you both to will and to do of His own good pleasure," Philippians 2:13 belongs already to that grace which faith secures, in order that good works may be within the reach of man,—even the good works which faith achieves through the love which is shed abroad in the heart by the Holy Ghost which is given to us. If we believe that we may attain this grace (and of course believe voluntarily), then the question arises whence we have this will?—if from nature, why it is not at everybody's command, since the same God made all men? if from God's gift, then again, why is not the gift open to all, since "He will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth?" 1 Timothy 2:4 Chapter 58.—The Free Will of Man is an Intermediate PowerLet us then, first of all, lay down this proposition, and see whether it satisfies the question before us: that free will, naturally assigned by the Creator to our rational soul, is such a neutral power, as can either incline towards faith, or turn towards unbelief. Consequently a man cannot be said to have even that will with which he believes in God, without having received it; since this rises at the call of God out of the free will which he received naturally when he was created. God no doubt wishes all men to be saved 1 Timothy 2:4 and to come into the knowledge of the truth; but yet not so as to take away from them free will, for the good or the evil use of which they may be most righteously judged. This being the case, unbelievers indeed do contrary to the will of God when they do not believe His gospel; nevertheless they do not therefore overcome His will, but rob their own selves of the great, nay, the very greatest, good, and implicate themselves in penalties of punishment, destined to experience the power of Him in punishments whose mercy in His gifts they despised. Thus God's will is for ever invincible; but it would be vanquished, unless it devised what to do with such as despised it, or if these despises could in any way escape from the retribution which He has appointed for such as they.………………….Chapter 60 [XXXIV.]—The Will to Believe is from God:Let this discussion suffice, if it satisfactorily meets the question we had to solve. It may be, however, objected in reply, that we must take heed lest some one should suppose that the sin would have to be imputed to God which is committed by free will, if in the passage where it is asked, "What do you have that you did not receive?" 1 Corinthians 4:7 the very will by which we believe is reckoned as a gift of God, because it arises out of the free will which we received at our creation. Let the objector, however, attentively observe that this will is to be ascribed to the divine gift, not merely because it arises from our free will, which was created naturally with us; but also because God acts upon us by the incentives of our perceptions, to will and to believe, either externally by evangelical exhortations, where even the commands of the law also do something, if they so far admonish a man of his infirmity that he betakes himself to the grace that justifies by believing; or internally, where no man has in his own control what shall enter into his thoughts, although it appertains to his own will to consent or to dissent. Since God, therefore, in such ways acts upon the reasonable soul in order that it may believe in Him (and certainly there is no ability whatever in free will to believe, unless there be persuasion or summons towards some one in whom to believe), it surely follows that it is God who both works in man the willing to believe, and in all things prevents us with His mercy. To yield our consent, indeed, to God's summons, or to withhold it, is (as I have said) the function of our own will. And this not only does not invalidate what is said, "For what do you have that you did not receive?" 1 Corinthians 4:7 but it really confirms it. For the soul cannot receive and possess these gifts, which are here referred to, except by yielding its consent. And thus whatever it possesses, and whatever it receives, is from God; and yet the act of receiving and having belongs, of course, to the receiver and possessor. Now, should any man be for constraining us to examine into this profound mystery, why this person is so persuaded as to yield, and that person is not, there are only two things occurring to me, which I should like to advance as my answer: "O the depth of the riches!" Romans 11:33 and "Is there unrighteousness with God?" Romans 9:14 If the man is displeased with such an answer, he must seek more learned disputants; but let him beware lest he find presumptuous ones"

It took Augustine a mighty long time to say this:

Quote:
"it surely follows that it is God who both works in man the willing to believe, and in all things prevents us with His mercy. To yield our consent, indeed, to God's summons, or to withhold it, is (as I have said) the function of our own will. And this not only does not invalidate what is said, "For what do you have that you did not receive?" 1 Corinthians 4:7 but it really confirms it. For the soul cannot receive and possess these gifts, which are here referred to, except by yielding its consent."

what he said in the work "On the Spirit and the letter" shows that we still have the power to accept or reject the gifts that God gives. So we know that at least in this stage of his life he didn't believe in "irresistible" grace.

However, in the work "grace and free will" He says:

Quote:
"Of the same Lord again it is said, "It is God who worketh in you, even to will! It is certain that it is we that act when we act; but it is He who makes us act, by applying efficacious powers to our will, who has said, "I will make you to walk in my statutes, and to observe my judgements, and to do them"

(On Grace and free Will) page 32 In quoting Norman Geisler in the book Chosen but free: second edition page 173

I'm tired right now so I'm gonna quote some of what Geisler quoted for now. I'll look at the primary sources later.

Quote:
"Our Lord says plainly, however, in the Gospel, when upbraiding the impious city: "How often would I have gathered thy children together; even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not! as if the will of God had been overcome by the will of men.....but even though she was unwilling, He gathered together as many of her children as He wished: for He does not will some things and do them, and will others and do them not; but "He hath done all that He pleased in heaven and in earth"

(Enchiridion, 97) quoting Norman Geisler's quote of Augustine in the book Chosen but free: second edition page 177

Quote:
"Where is what the Donatists were wont to cry: Man is at liberty to believe or not believe? towards whom did Christ use violence? Whom did He compel? Here they have the Apostle Paul. Let them recognize in his case Christ first compelling and afterwards teaching; first striking, and afterwards consoling. For it is wonderful how he who entered the service of the gospel in the first instance under the compulsion of bodily punishment, afterwards labored more in the gospel than all they who were called by word only; and he who was compelled by the greater influence of fear to love, displayed that perfect love which casts out fear. Why, therefore, should not the Church use force in compelling her lost sons to return, if the lost sons compelled others to their destruction.

? (correction of Donatists, 6.22-23)quoting Norman Geisler's quote of Augustine in the book Chosen but free: second edition page 174 & 175

It seems in his later works he was working towards an "irresistible grace view"But His early works are not really that different from what John Cassian was saying about the Natural will and how God implants some goodness in it so that man can choose the good.

And how for some men that good was so weakened that God's grace had to preceed the will. Cassian also believed that the will of some men was able to preceed the grace of God. The only difference between the two on this point was that John Cassian stressed man's chooseing as being of the natural will whereas Augustine....at least in the work called "In the Spirit and the Letter" stressed that as being a gift of God. Augustine also believed that God's grace must always preceed the will of man. Augustine only seemed to stress what man could do when it came to the issue of accepting or rejecting the gifts of God. In Augustin's later years even that seemed to give way to some type of coercion of the will.

This is what Arminius had to say about free will.

http://www.godrules.net/library/arminius/arminius29.htm


Quote:
The will

VII. In this state, the free will of man towards the true good is not only wounded, maimed, infirm, bent, and weakened; but it is also imprisoned, destroyed, and lost. And its powers are not only debilitated and useless unless they be assisted by grace, but it has no powers whatever except such as are excited by Divine grace. For Christ has said, "Without me ye can do nothing."

The mind

VIII. The mind of man, in this state, is dark, destitute of the saving knowledge of God, and, according to the Apostle, incapable of those things which belong to the Spirit of God. For "the animal man has no perception of the things of the Spirit of God;" (1 Cor. ii, 14 in which passage man is called "animal," not from the animal body, but from anima, the soul itself, which is the most noble part of man, but which is so encompassed about with the clouds of ignorance, as to be distinguished by the epithets of "vain" and "foolish;" and men themselves, thus darkened in their minds, are denominated "mad" or foolish, "fools," and even "darkness" itself.


The Heart

IX. To the darkness of the mind succeeds the perverseness of the affections and of the heart, according to which it hates and has an aversion to that which is truly good and pleasing to God; but it loves and pursues what is evil. The Apostle was unable to afford a more luminous description of this perverseness, than he has given in the following words: "The carnal mind is enmity against God. For it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So then, they that are in the flesh cannot please God." (Rom. viii, 7.) For this reason, the human heart itself is very often called deceitful and perverse, uncircumcised, hard and stony." (Jer. xiii, 10; xvii, 9; Ezek. xxxvi, 26.) Its imagination is said to be "only evil from his very youth;" (Gen. vi, 5; viii, 21 and "out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries," &c. (Matt. xv, 19.)


X. Exactly correspondent to this darkness of the mind, and perverseness of the heart, is the utter weakness of all the powers to perform that which is truly good, and to omit the perpetration of that which is evil, in a due mode and from a due end and cause. The subjoined sayings of Christ serve to describe this impotence. "A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit." (Matt. vii, 18.) "How can ye, being evil, speak good things?" (xii, 34.) The following relates to the good which is properly prescribed in the gospel: "No man can come to me, except the Father draw him." (John vi, 44.) As do likewise the following words of the Apostle: "The carnal mind is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be;" (Rom. viii, 7



So if anything Arminianism should be called "Semi-Augustinianism" rather than "Semi-Pelagianism". True Arminianism embraces Augustine's Hard Deterministic views about the fall of man in his Older years. But they also embrace the free will views of Augustine's early years. So they properly should be called "Semi-Augustinian" or "Moderate Augustinians" The Calvinists seem to only want to embrace Augustines older teachings. His Deterministic views and nothing else.

The real difference between Arminianism and Semi-pelagianism is that Semi-Pelagianism tought that the grace of God must preceed the will of "some" people. Whereas Arminianism believes that the grace of God must preceed the will of "all men".

This is the fundemental difference. the difference that very few seem to notice. Also classical and weslyian Arminianism seems to teach that the will of man was destroyed and lost by the Fall of man. I don't think Semi-Pelagianism ever went that far. I know the greek Fathers never went that far. Nor did the Latin Fathers before Augustine. Nor did Augustine in his early Christian years.

My view is that the Grace of God must preceed the will of all men but the will of man was never destroyed or lost by the fall for that would mean that the Image of God would of been destroyed and lost.

The will of man is broken, bent, fallen, wounded, damaged, and weakened. But it was never destroyed.....nor was it ever lost.



INLOVE Jnorm